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After the financial markets slumped worldwide in 2008, securitiza-
tions were seen as a major cause of the conflagration. The securi-
tization market dried up because this financial instrument was no 
longer trusted. At the time, no one thought securitizations had any 
future as a financial innovation. However, just three years after the 
financial meltdown, the securitization market in the US has made a 
recovery, despite its continued systemic risks. There is still no unified 
regulatory framework nor binding transparency. Hardly anything has 
been learnt from the financial crisis of 2008.
Securitizations are tradable financial products. They 
allow the risk to be diversified by pooling credit con-
tracts.1 The next step is to break down these credit pools 
accordingly into different liability tranches .2 The diffe-
rent liabilities are related to respective risk categories in 
the case of credit defaults (box). In practice, a special-
purpose vehicle (SPV) is created as an intermediary bet-
ween creditors and debtors.3 This is established by the 
investment bank (arranger) as a separate legal entity to 
manage the securitizated assets (Figure 1).4 
The parent company’s liability risks in respect of the 
SPV were not typically included in the bank’s balan-
ce sheet as contigent claims. The extent of off-balan-
ce sheet activities was not limited by regulatory cons-
traints and could exceed the bank's equity. This enab-
led the bank as parent company of the SPV to generate 
a larger volume of liabilities uncovered by their equity 
base and therefore achieve higher profitability but as-
sociated with higher risks.
1   Coval, Joshua, Jakub Jurek, and Erik Stafford, “The Economics of 
Structured Finance,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 1 (2009): 
3–25. 
2   Individual debtors no longer have a direct debtor-creditor relationship 
with their respective creditor; rather, they are now part of the pool of debt 
obligations. 
3   The SPV is a temporary legal entity whose sole purpose is to manage the 
creditor-debtor contractual relationships of the securitized assets. Once the last 
payments of securitized assets have taken place, the SPV is dissolved. In 
general, these SPVs have no equity but are secured by an open line of credit 
from the parent company, i.e. the investment bank, to supply liquidity and 
compensation in the event of unexpected losses. Report on Special Purpose 
Entities. Bank for International Settlements. Basel, BIZ, September 2009.
4   This also has the advantage for the investment bank that there are no 
capital requirements for the credit pools securing the SPV. As a result, this is 
known as an off-balance-sheet operation. The SPV is not included in the 
investment bank’s balance sheet due to it having its own legal status. However, 
when needed, this only works if the investment bank has sufficient cash 
reserves or can obtain these from the money market. This was no longer the 
case in particular after the crash of Lehman Brothers and the collapse of the 
money market before the central banks intervened.
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securitization Boom in the shadow Banking 
system
Due to the decoupling of any legal obligations with the 
arrangers, SPVs became part of the shadow banking 
system.5 Shadow banks did not have to deposit a certain 
percentage of their equity as collateral, like commercial 
banks with their on-balance sheet operations. It was this 
particular competitive advantage which resulted in the 
dynamic growth of securitizations before the financi-
al crisis broke out. 
Special-purpose vehicles located abroad can be difficult 
for supervisory authorities to control. Access to necessa-
ry information is usually only possible with the coope-
ration of supervisory authorities in offshore financial 
centers.6 This was well known before the international 
financial crisis. Even if the national supervisory autho-
rities and central banks were in the possession of infor-
mation about such transactions,these transactions were, 
however, explicitly excluded from regulation and there-
fore not under the responsibility of financial superviso-
ry authorities. This encouraged regulatory arbitrage. A 
uniform global regulatory framework, or even compre-
hensive mandatory transparency, is not currently on the 
horizon, making it even more difficult to enforce stric-
ter regulations at national level.7
Risks in the securitization model were 
underestimated
When debtors defaulted, the creditors could do little to 
assert their claims as owners of the securitizations. Alt-
5   “The emergence of a shadow banking system is not a new phenomenon. 
What was new over recent decades was the scale of its activities, which is 
closely related to the rapid expansion of securitization. The securitization of 
previously illiquid items in banks’ balance sheets gave perhaps the strongest 
boost to the financial sector. Securitization allows traditional banking assets to 
be transformed into tradable instruments, thus creating tradable assets. It acts 
as a multiplier of negotiable financial claims or, more simply, a multiplier of 
finance.” See Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, “Monetary policy transmission in a changing 
financial system: Lessons from the recent past, Thoughts about the future.” 
Speech by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB at 
the Barclays Global Inflation Conference, New York City, June 14, 2010.
6   Financial Stability Board: Financial Security Forum announces a new 
process to promote further improvements in offshore financial centers (OFCs). 
Financial Stability Board, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, March 11, 
2005. IMF, Offshore Financial Centers The Assessment Program—A Progress 
Report. Washington DC, International Monetary Fund, February 25, 2005. The 
IMF has since then integrated this program into the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP). Consequently, a separate survey of offshore 
financial centers is no longer available.
7   “Global finance cannot realistically be submitted to a single rulebook. The 
Basel Accord itself sets a minimum standard, not an optimum one. Several 
jurisdictions, from Switzerland to China, are considering higher requirements.” 
Nicolas Veron, “After the G20: time for realism in global financial regulation,” 
Brussels, Bruegel, November 2010. Since the Seoul Summit, the G20 is now 
committed to the gradual implementation of Basel III from 2013 to 2019.
Box 
Breakdown of securitizations Into Different Risk classes
Overall, risks present in the credit pool are structured in a securitization 
into different risk classes, i.e. tranches, (usually senior tranche—very 
low risk, mezzanine—intermediate risk and junior tranche—high risk). 
Accordingly, this is associated with different interest payments to the 
respective investors in such assets. Through this, the credit market can 
be supplied with different investment risks according to the risk preferen-
ces of investors. 
By allocating different liabilities to different tranches of the securiti-
zation these trances obtain different credit ratings. Usually the senior 
tranche obtains the highest credit rating level. At Moody’s this is Aaa. 
Mezzanine and Junior tranche obtain lower ratings due to their higher 
riskiness. From the arranger perspective, the securitization process pro-
duces an overall value that is higher than the sum of the single values 
of the individual contracts if they were treated separately. As a result, 
the investment bank can obtain higher profits through securitization 
compared to the single contracts.
Since only a limited percentage share of defaults is expected in the 
overall credit pool, based on model calculations and experience values, 
buyers of senior tranches could be totally exempted from the resulting 
potential losses. The two lower risk tranches (mezzanine and junior 
tranches) are liable for expected payment losses.
Rating classifications at Moody’s 
The rating codes used are:1 
Investment grade  •	
Aaa—reliable and stable debtors of the highest quality 
Aa—good debtors, slightly higher risk (especially in the long term)  
A—general economic situation should be monitored 
Baa—average quality debtors currently operating satisfactorily 
Not suitable for investment (junk bonds) 
Ba—very dependent on the overall economic situation 
B— financial situation is notoriously changeable 
Caa—speculative bonds, low debtor income 
Ca—usually has payment problems 
C—in default of payment 
NR—no rating
Not suitable for investment (junk bonds)  •	
Ba—very dependent on the overall economic situation 
B— financial situation is notoriously changeable 
Caa—speculative bonds, low debtor income 
Ca—usually has payment problems 
C—in default of payment 
NR—no rating
1  Moody’s, Rating Symbols and Definitions. New York: Moody’s Investors Service.5 DIW Economic Bulletin 6.2011
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hough they are able in principle to claim legaly a rescis-
sion of the contract against the arranger of the securiti-
zation, this fails de facto when the issuing investment 
bank is illiquid or insolvent. Since it was usually very lar-
ge investment and commercial banks that were active as 
arrangers in the securitization business, it was generally 
expected that they would be able to provide compensati-
on even for larger losses in single cases. Therefore, the 
risk was considered minimal and negligible.
an unexpected shock Destroys the 
securitization model assumptions
The largely unregulated SPVs got involved more and 
more in the risky US real estate market, in particular 
the subprime mortage market. These securitizations 
were implicitly linked to each other through joint mar-
ket risks, i.e. a general decline in real estate prices and 
liquidity risks. In the course of the financial crisis, it 
was not only individual securities but the securitiza-
tion model itself that was therefore called into questi-
on.8 A broad mistrust of securitizations arose due to the 
lack of transparency for providers and even more so for 
buyers. At the same time, demand from large commer-
cial banks active in the securitization market for addi-
tional liquidity to cover unexpected obligations soared 
in order for them to offer sufficient funds for potenti-
al claims. The interbank market for short-term liquidi-
ty, the centerpiece of the entire global financial system, 
was rapidly drying up because of this sudden excess li-
quidity demand.
The international liquidity crunch is reflected in the 
development of LIBOR.9 The Libor is used as a ben-
chmark interest rate for a number of medium to long-
term credit agreements with a corresponding interest 
rate mark-up for longer maturities on variable-rate in-
terest rate contracts. Usually, there is a very close rela-
tionship between the LIBOR rate and the discount rate 
of the central bank—in this case, the US Federal Reser-
ve (Fed). However, this relationship collapsed complete-
ly for some time due to the serious malfunctions in the 
money markets (Figure 2). A collapse of global finan-
cial markets was only prevented through the interven-
tion of the central banks in the US and Europe, which 
8   The crisis was triggered by the closure of a hedge fund of the investment 
bank Bear Stearns in 2007 and this gave rise to further speculations about 
other problematic securitizations.
9   The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is the daily reference interest 
rate for the interbank market which is fixed on each working day at 11.00 am 
London time. These are interest rates, determined by major international banks 
in the British Bankers’ Association in London, at which they borrow money from 
other banks in the market. 
have since made available almost unlimited liquidity at 
interest rates close to zero. 
This revealed the interdependence of accumulated risks 
in the large pool of securitized assets. This invalidated 
the securitization model’s basic assumption—the non-
existent or minimal correlation of the risks between sin-
gle credit contracts—due to macroeconomic events such 
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With a securitization, the creditor no longer has a direct relationship with the debtor.
Figure 2
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The close relationship between the central bank and interbank interest rates broke up 
during the financial market crisis.DIW Economic Bulletin 6.2011 6
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ling property prices.10 Before tradable securitizations had 
become illiquid and by this toxic assets. Nobody could 
plausibly determine the actual value of a securitization 
with the previous now invalidated valuation rules.11
Development of securitizations since the 
outbreak of the crisis
A recent report by the Association for Financial Markets 
in Europe (AFME) showed that in 2008, new issuances 
of securitizations in the US fell by 61.2 percent from 
EUR 2,404.9 billion to EUR 933.6 billion compared to 
the previous year.12 Since then, values have gradually re-
covered to EUR 1,276.7 billion in 2010 (Table 1). As a re-
sult, the market volume of new issues is still only about 
half as large as before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brot-
10   David X. Li, “On Default Correlation: A Copula Function Approach,” The 
Journal of Fixed Income, vol. 9, (March 2000): 43-54.
11   Georg Erber, “Verbriefungen: Eine Finanzinnovation und ihre fatalen 
Folgen,” DIW Berlin Weekly Report no. 43/2008.
12   AFME, Securitization data report Q1: 2011. London, 2011.
Table 1
securitizations Issued in Europe and the us1
US2 Europe
in EUR billions  Change in percent in EUR billions  Change in percent
2000 1 088.0  – 78.2  –
2001 2 308.4  112.2 152.6  95.1
2002 2 592.7  12.3 157.7  3.3
2003 2 914.5  12.4 217.3  37.8
2004 1 956.6  –32.9 243.5  12.1
2005 2 650.6  35.5 327.0  34.3
2006 2 455.8  –7.3 481.0  47.1
2007 2 404.9  –2.1 453.7  –5.7
2008 933.6 –61.2 711.1 56.7
2009 1 358.9 45.6 414.1 –41.8
2010 1 276.7 –6.0 382.9 –7.5
20113 265.3 – 114.4 –
1  Based on quarterly surveys. 
2  Converted using exchange rates at the end of each quarter. 
3  1st quarter of 2011 only.
Sources: Bloomberg, Citigroup, Dealogic, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, RBS, 
Thomson Reuters, Unicredit, AFME & SIFMA and calculations by DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2011
In the US, emissions fell sharply in 2008, but did not fall in Europe until 2009.
Table 2
outstanding securitizations by country
in EUR billion
2007 2008 2009 2010 4th Quarter 2010 1st Quarter 2011
Share in percent
4th Quarter 2010 1st Quarter 2011
Austria 3.6  3.3  3.0  2.6 2.5  2.4  0.1 0.1
Belgium 8.6  50.5  61.9  69.5 76.4  75.1  3.6 3.6
Finland 0.0  7.7  6.4  5.0 4.6  4.3  0.2 0.2
France 26.4  32.0  34.0  33.9 34.6  38.7  1.7 1.9
Germany 93.8  133.8  125.7  97.0 93.3  87.4  4.5 4.2
Greece 9.9  20.7  37.5  38.2 35.1  31.9  1.7 1.5
Ireland 26.2  58.0  64.6  71.7 72.1  68.6  3.4 3.3
Italy 131.1  198.5  222.2  222.6 214.2  203.0  10.2 9.8
Netherlands 236.7  293.7  308.0  317.4 319.6  319.1  15.3 15.4
Portugal 32.2  41.4  48.5  50.1 57.3  60.1  2.7 2.9
Russia 4.2  4.4  4.5  4.4 4.3  4.1  0.2 0.2
Spain 231.9  294.9  306.5  291.1 297.4  301.1  14.2 14.5
Turkey 6.8  6.6  6.3  4.9 4.8  4.5  0.2 0.2
UK 549.9  693.5  681.1  647.8 622.1  625.0  29.7 30.1
Others 8.2  7.0  6.3  2.7 2.8  4.2  0.1 0.2
Pan-Europe 41.7  56.6  68.4  58.7 57.9  52.5  2.8 2.5
Multinational 206.2  232.4  226.9  205.5 193.5  194.2  9.2 9.4
Europe overall 1 617.5  2 134.9  2 211.7  2 123.3 2 092.6  2 076.3  100.0 100.0
US – 7 056.3  7 023.4  8 027.1 8 264.2  6 792.0  – –
Sources: Bloomberg (USA & Europe), Fannie Mae (USA), Freddie Mac (USA), Ginnie Mae (USA), Thomson Reuters (USA), SIFMA (USA & Europe) and calculations  
by DIW Berlin.
© DIW Berlin 2011
In 2011, securitization portfolios fell sharply in the US while the decline in Europe since 2009 has been moderate.7 DIW Economic Bulletin 6.2011
sEcuRItIzatIons aRE DEaD—long lIvE sEcuRItIzatIons?
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers soon.15 The financi-
al industry has been granted long transition periods to 
meet the new regulatory obligations, particularly with 
regard to higher equity requirements.
In Europe, however, the overall outstanding issuance of 
securitizations since 2008 has remained almost stable. 
In 2008, it had peaked at EUR 2135 billions, in the first 
quarter of 2011 it has again recovered to EUR 2,076 bil-
lion. Meanwhile, there have been no remarkable fluc-
tuations in the outstanding issuances. However, it ap-
pears that single countries in Europe have responded 
differently. In Germany, the volume of outstanding is-
suances in 2008 was EUR 133.8 billion but this figu-
re fell to EUR 87.4 billion in the first quarter of 2011. 
In the UK, there was only a slight decrease from EUR 
693.6 billion in 2008 to EUR 625 billion in the first 
quarter of 2011. In contrast, volumes of outstanding is-
suances in Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium 
have grown significantly. Crisis countries such as Ire-
land (2007: EUR 26.2 billion, first quarter 2011: EUR 
68.6 billion), Portugal (2007: EUR 32.2 billion, first 
quarter 2011: EUR 60.1 billion) and Greece (2007: EUR 
15   Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Black Swan: The Impact of the highly Improbable. 
London, 2007. In his book, the author argues that the financial crisis of 2008 
was a once-in-a-century event that will not happen again soon. Consequently, 
there was no need to push forward more urgently a comprehensive regulation 
of the securitization markets. This view also seems to be held by Alan 
Greenspan. Alan Greenspan, “Der Fluch der vielen Sicherheitspuffer,” Financial 
Times Deutschland, July 27, 2011.
hers. But it has not resulted in the securitization market 
in the US drying up completely. 
In Europe, the decline of new issueings of securitiza-
tions only occurred after a significant delay. In 2008, 
new issues reached an all-time high of EUR 711.1 bil-
lion. The first significant decline to EUR 414.1 billion 
took place in 2009. Since then, the volume of new issu-
es continued to fall, but was still at quite a considerable 
level in 2010 at EUR 382.9 billion. When considering 
the results of the first quarter of 2011, it appears that 
this level might be reached again in 2011.
This development of the securitization before the Leh-
man bankruptcy is even more evident in the outstan-
ding issuances of the securitizations. Apparently, not 
least because of the problems in dealing with toxic out-
standing securitizations, the reduction of pre-crisis se-
curitizations is very slow (Table 2). In 2008, the secu-
ritization portfolios in the US were at EUR 7,056 billi-
on and as a result of continuing new issues, this figure 
was still rising even in the last quarter of 2010 to EUR 
8,264 billion.13 It is amazing that there are no signifi-
cant reductions of outstanding issuances, instead the-
re is again an increase in securitizations in the US. The 
securitization market is therefore obviously indispensa-
ble as a tool for sufficient liquidity supply to the US eco-
nomy, despite the continuing systemic risks associated 
with securitization model. Only since the first quarter 
of 2011, a significant reduction of the volume to EUR 
6,792 billion has occurred.
The trade-off between the economic consequences of a 
credit crunch due to stricter regulation of the financi-
al markets and the consequences of another financial 
market crisis due to a lack of strict regulation prevails. 
Supporters of stricter regulation could not push through 
their demands for a comprehensive regulatory frame-
work in particular for securitizations.14 This would have 
led to a significant increase in equity requirement ratios 
in the financial sector, thereby reducing the capability 
to create sufficient credits, i.e. causing a credit crunch. 
Obviously, in the US and Europe it is hoped that there 
will be no recurrence of such a dramatic event as the 
13   These figures are partially misleading due to exchange rate effects 
resulting from their conversion from US dollars into euros using current 
exchange rates. 
14   Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing an unstable Economy. New York, 1986. 
Hyman P. Minsky: Can „It“ Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance. 
New York, June 1982.
Figure 3
outstanding securitizations in Europe by year 
of Issue1 







2011 2009 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 pre 1998
1  In the first quarter of 2011. Based on rates at the time of issue. Subsequent 
restructuring does not affect securitizations in the year of issue. 
Source: Sifma.
© DIW Berlin 2011
The largest share of the outstanding securitizations in Europe occur 
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9.9 billion, first quarter 2011: EUR 31.9 billion), whose 
credit ratings have recently been downgraded to junk 
bond status because of high public debt, have actually 
registered a significant increase in securitizations since 
the outbreak of the crisis. Apparently, the risk of secu-
ritizations is assessed differently among the individual 
EU member countries.
The distribution of outstanding issuances of securiti-
zations in Europe according to the year of issue shows 
that there is still a considerable legacy from the years 
before the Lehman collapse included (Figure 3). Howe-
ver, they diminish in importance in coming years, par-
ticularly due to new issuances. 
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, Moody’s has 
not dramatically downgraded the credit rating of secu-
ritizations in Europe (Table 3). Considering the sum of 
all shares with investment grade credit ratings, there is 
a slight decline in shares from 98.9 percent in the first 
quarter of 2008 to 94.9 percent in the first quarter of 
2011. However, this decline of four percentage points 
Table 3
outstanding securitizations in the us and Europe according to moody’s Rating categories
In percent1
2011 2010 2009 2008
1st Quarter 4th Quarter 3rd Quarter2nd Quarter 1st Quarter 4th Quarter 3rd Quarter2nd Quarter 1st Quarter 4th Quarter 3rd Quarter2nd Quarter 1st Quarter
Europa
Aaa/AAA 70.2 73.4 72.9 72.9 75.6 78.0 79.6 80.7 81.1 84.3 84.1 85.5 70.2
Aa/AA 11.5 10.6 10.3 11.0 9.8 8.7 8.1 6.9 6.5 5.4 5.8 5.2 11.5
A/A 7.5 5.8 6.5 6.1 5.9 5.0 4.4 4.7 5.6 4.9 4.8 4.4 7.5
Baa/BBB 5.8 5.5 5.3 5.3 3.8 3.6 3.5 4.0 4.2 3.6 3.6 3.9 5.8
Investment grade  
(Aaa to Baa)
94.9 95.3 95.0 95.2 95.1 95.3 95.6 96.3 97.4 98.2 98.3 98.9 94.9
Ba/BB 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.4
B/B 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.0
Caa/CCC 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.4
Ca/CC 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.8
C/C 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4
Junk Bonds (Ba to C) 5.1 4.7 5.0 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.4 3.7 2.6 1.8 1.7 1.1 5.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
usa
Aaa/AAA 30.2 33.7 35.3 33.7 37.8 37.9 41.2 46.2 63.0 70.4 73.7 81.8 30.2
Aa/AA 9.4 9.8 10.3 9.8 10.4 10.1 8.1 7.5 8.7 8.3 7.3 5.4 9.4
A/A 5.7 6.1 6.7 6.1 7.6 7.8 6.9 6.2 6.8 6.6 5.7 3.9 5.7
Baa/BBB 5.7 5.4 6.3 5.4 7.3 7.5 7.6 8.0 7.6 5.1 4.7 4.8 5.7
Investment grade  
(Aaa to Baa)
50.9 55.0 58.5 55.0 63.1 63.3 63.7 67.9 86.0 90.4 91.3 95.9 50.9
Ba/BB 4.2 4.0 5.1 4.0 6.0 6.0 6.7 5.3 3.1 2.4 2.1 1.4 4.2
B/B 7.3 6.1 7.7 6.1 8.5 8.6 8.0 7.2 2.7 2.5 2.7 1.1 7.3
Caa/CCC 16.9 15.4 14.6 15.4 11.2 11.0 9.9 10.3 3.0 1.3 1.6 0.7 16.9
Ca/CC 9.9 9.4 7.3 9.4 5.6 5.6 5.9 4.9 2.6 2.2 1.3 0.5 9.9
C/C 10.7 10.1 6.7 10.1 5.6 5.5 5.8 4.4 2.7 1.3 1.0 0.5 10.7
Junk Bonds (Ba to C) 49.1 45.0 41.5 45.0 36.9 36.7 36.3 32.1 14.0 9.6 8.7 4.1 49.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1 1 The distribution is based on current ratings and the original volume of securitizations issued. "Unrated" and "defaulted" securitizations are included. After the slash is the equivalent rating 
category from Standard & Poor’s. 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service.
© DIW Berlin 2011
In Europe, only about five percent of securitizations are categorized as junk bonds. But in the US they make up almost half.9 DIW Economic Bulletin 6.2011
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Europe: stability Pact offers Disincentives
In Europe, when the Stability and Growth Pact was int-
roduced in the Eurozone it created incentives for coun-
tries with highly indebted national budgets, to use secu-
ritizations and other derivatives to reduce their debt and 
deficit levels due to accounting rules which kept these 
transactions off-balance from the statistics. 
In 2001, Greece therefore set up a future-flow securiti-
zation of expected EU transfer payments from EU struc-
is extremely moderate against the background of the fi-
nancial crisis.
us: significant old Debt from the Pre-crisis 
Period
The picture is somewhat different in the US. Here, the 
proportion of outstanding securitizations with an invest-
ment grade rating was still a respectable 95.9 percent 
in the first quarter of 2001. However, since then this fi-
gure has fallen steadily to 50.9 percent in the first quar-
ter of 2011. Looking at outstanding issuance figures for 
the US in the first quarter of 2011 shows that there is 
approximately EUR 3.335 trillion of junk bonds present 
in the US securitization market. This obviously cannot 
solely be an outcome of the subprime crisis in the secu-
ritization market for residential mortgage-backed secu-
rities (RMBS).16 Unfortunately, there is no information 
about the maturity structure of outstanding securitiza-
tions in the US so the share of old debt from the peri-
od before the financial crisis cannot be separated from 
the new issuances afterwards. However, these results at 
least show that there is still a significant need for reva-
luations and write-downs in the US securitization mar-
ket, especially with regard to RMBS.17 
Evidently, ratings adjustment in both the US and in Eu-
rope have fallen significantly (Table 4). In 2008, Moody’s 
made 49,565 downgrades and only 863 upgrades in the 
US, so after a peak in 2009 with 53,543 downgrades, the-
re was a significant decline in 2010 to 26,483 downgra-
des. Apparently, however, the rating of securitizations 
in the US is still very error prone as compared to Euro-
pe where there are still too many positive ratings. It has 
apparently still not been possible to reduce the number 
of incorrect assessments of securitizations in the US to 
a comparatively low level as in Europe.18 Obviously, still 
more risky papers in the US are securitized. Lower equi-
ty requirements and variable interest rates probably are 
important factors here.
16   Robert J. Shiller, The Subprime Solution—How Today’s Global Financial 
Crisis Happened, and What to Do about it. Princeton, 2008.
17   This ought to be the case in particular at now re-nationalized real estate 
financiers Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and Ginnie Mae, which dominate the 
market for financing residential properties in the US. Further information can 
be found in the AFME’s Securitization Data Report Q1:2011. London, 2011.
18   But rating agency Fitch now expects greater numbers of payment 
defaults, especially among European commercial mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS). Stefan Schaaf, “Fitch warnt vor neuer Verlustwelle – Ratingagentur 
sieht steigende Ausfallraten bei älteren forderungsbesicherten Wertpapieren,” 
Financial Times Deutschland, August 5, 2011.
Table 4
upgrades and Downgrades 1 of securitizations
2008 2009 2010 1st Quarter 2011
Fitch
France 0/14 0/40 1/6 1/8
Germany 17/36 17/404 23/124 11/27
Italy 14/30 14/47 7/41 2/9
Netherlands 27/18 2/28 6/16 1/9
Spain 16/41 6/269 15/141 1/77
UK 83/894 28/630 88/276 9/86
Multinational2 27/141 19/790 20/183 8/33
Europe overall 184/1 174 86/2 208 160/787 33/249
US3 718/27 675 198/44 183 269/15 753 68/3 882
Moody‘s
France 0/2 1/1 0/1 0/0
Germany 2/43 10/59 10/23 0/4
Italy 0/15 2/25 3/7 0/1
Netherlands 0/5 4/42 4/20 1/0
Spain 1/54 2/134 0/53 1/44
UK 16/211 7/342 37/134 0/27
Multinational4 79/2 140 53/3 326 103/356 94/42
Europe overall 98/2 470 79/3 929 157/594 96/118
US 863/49 565 590/53 543 1759/26 483 696/8 448
Standard & Poor‘s
France 2/18 2/28 2/3 0/2
Germany 18/63 2/206 24/139 11/8
Italy 27/15 20/26 6/40 0/7
Netherlands 6/5 27/32 2/22 0/13
Spain 6/65 15/192 4/135 0/52
UK 65/496 34/1.026 120/518 15/46
Multinational4 131/2 990 73/3 592 459/1 806 45/120
Europe overall 255/3 652 173/5 102 617/2 663 71/248
US 581/29 713 363/37 946 662/18 461 818/2 725
1  Upgrades/downgrades. The figures are not comparable due to differences in the rating methodologies of 
the three rating agencies. 
2     Fitch’s multinational classification contains Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) emissions 
in various legal systems, along with rating measures in EMEA countries, notably Austria, Belgium, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, and the Russian Federation. Fitch assigns CDOs to those countries where the majority of 
bonds originate. 
3  Canadian securitizations are probably included here. 
4 All emissions with collateral located in several countries, as well as all CDOs denominated in euros are 
contained in this category.
Sources: Fitch Ratings; Moody‘s Investors Service; Standard & Poor‘s.
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rivatives could not longer be used.20 According to infor-
mation from Eurostat, none of these financial enginee-
ring transactions performed by Greece has so far been 
fully disclosed to Eurostat.21 Neither the EU Commis-
sion, nor Eurostat, nor participating countries, such as 
Italy, Greece, and Portugal have ever submitted an of-
ficial detailed report on their respective activities. It has 
been the task of the international press and insiders in 
the financial scene to publish some details.
The focus of securitizations in Europe is underlying 
mortgage loans from the housing market (Table 5). In 
addition, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are of 
20  European Commission/Eurostat, Eurostat Guidance on accounting rules 
from EDP—Financial Derivatives. Brussels—Luxembourg, March 13, 2008. 
21   Eurostat, Supplementary tables on financial turmoil. Luxembourg, epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/
excessive_deficit/supplementary_tables_financial_turmoil.
tural funds of two billion Euro under the SPV-name At-
las.19 This securitization was arranged by the French 
bank BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank. Its term was 
seven years, ending in 2008. Only this made it possib-
le for Greece to meet the 3 percent deficit-to-GDP-ratio 
necessary to enter the Eurozone afterwards. 
After these manipulations were disclosed, the rules for 
calculating public deficits according to the regulations 
of the Stability and Growth Pact were step by step mo-
dified so that such accounting tricks using special de-
19   Kerin Hope, “Banks Face Scrutiny for Greek Securitization,” Financial 
Times, February 16, 2010. 
“Greece’s biggest securitization deal, through an SPV named Atlas, took place 
in 2001 when it raised €2bn backed by grants the finance ministry expected to 
receive from European Union structural funds over the following seven years.” 
Table 5
securitization Holdings by country and collateral types in Europe
in EUR billions
4th Quarter 2010 1st Quarter 2011
ABS1 CDO2 CMBS RMBS SME3 WBS4 Total5 ABS1 CDO2 CMBS RMBS SME3 WBS4 Total5
Austria 0.2 – 0.2 2.1 – – 2.5 0.0 – 0.2 2.1 – – 2.4
Belgium 0.2 – 0.1 61.5 14.6 – 76.4 0.2 – 0.1 60.3 14.6 – 75.1
Finland – – – 4.4 0.1 – 4.6 – – – 4.2 0.1 – 4.3
France 18.2 0.0 2.5 11.2 2.7 – 34.6 17.4 0.0 2.5 16.0 2.7 – 38.7
Germany 40.0 2.3 20.1 22.6 12.2 0.1 97.3 32.4 2.3 18.9 21.7 12.1 0.1 87.4
Greece 12.6 2.7 0.3 6.8 12.7 – 35.1 12.5 3.9 0.0 5.7 9.8 – 31.9
Ireland – 2.8 0.4 68.9 – – 72.1 – 2.7 0.4 65.5 – – 68.6
Italy 50.2 5.2 10.3 142.7 4.5 1.4 214.2 49.3 4.9 10.2 132.9 4.3 1.4 203.0
Netherlands 6.7 0.6 8.2 289.0 15.1 – 319.6 6.6 0.5 8.1 289.0 14.9 – 319.1
Portugal 6.9 – – 41.9 8.5 – 57.3 6.4 – – 41.8 11.9 – 60.1
Russia 1.3 – – 2.9 – – 4.3 1.2 – – 2.9 – – 4.1
Spain 19.2 2.1 0.4 190.0 85.7 – 297.4 23.6 2.1 0.4 188.7 86.4 – 301.1
Turkey 4.8 – – – – – 4.8 4.5 – – – – – 4.5
UK 41.2 7.0 66.3 453.9 3.6 50.1 622.1 43.7 6.9 67.5 451.7 3.1 52.1 625.0
Others6 0.1 1.9 – 0.4 0.4 – 2.8 1.5 1.9 – 0.4 0.4 – 4.2
Pan-Europe7 1.0 20.6 32.0 0.2 4.0 0.1 57.9 1.0 19.0 28.2 0.2 4.0 0.1 52.5
Multinational8 2.2 185.7 2.6 0.2 1.9 0.9 193.5 1.8 187.4 2.5 0.2 1.4 0.9 194.2
Europe overall 204.7 231.0 143.4 1 298.8 166.2 52.5 2 096.6 202.0 231.6 139.0 1 283.5 165.8 54.5 2 076.3
1 European Asset Backed Securities (ABS), in particular consisting of credit purchases of automobiles, credit card debt, consumer credit and student loans. 
2 Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) denominated in euros regardless of which European country they come from. 
3 CDOs of SMEs have been left out of the overall CDO category. 
4 Whole Business Securitization (WBS). Here, the entire revenue streams of an enterprise or operational part are securitized as future income streams. 
5 These figures may differ from previously published data due to new allocations, classification changes or additional information. 
6 Others includes European countries with outstanding securitizations that are too small to be reported separately. These include for example Georgia, Iceland, Ukraine, Switzerland, and Hungary. 
7 Pan-Europe was separated from the multinational category. It includes securitizations published for the whole of Europe. 
8 Multinational includes all securitizations that do not originate only from a single law sector, such as a country. In particular, it records almost all Euro-denominated CDOs.
Sources: Bloomberg; AFME; SIFMA.
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significant importance. The latter cannot clearly be as-
signed to single countries as other asset classes. This 
creates a gray area with regard to country-specific risks 
of the CDO-market adding-up to EUR 187.4 billion in 
the first quarter of 2011. Such CDOs could e.g. refer to 
collateralized debt from outstanding tax liabilities which 
are expected to be paid in the future. CDOs could as well 
refer to collateral of future income streams (future-flow 
securitizations), as expected income streams from EU 
structural funds. It would therefore be highly desirable 
if the current statistics published by AFME would break-
down the CDOs to private and public securitizations and 
allocate these to the single EU countries. 
conclusion
As demonstrated by current statistical information on 
market developments in securitizations in the US and 
Europe, the market has not declined initially as expec-
ted. Although there was a temporary marked decline, 
the market underwent a remarkable recovery especially 
in the US afterwards. Furthermore, the transparency 
of securitizations in terms of creditor and debtor struc-
tures has not significantly improved. While we know 
much more—but still not enough—about the supply 
side, there is still no sufficient information at all about 
risks on the buyer side .
The statistical data base still urgently needs a significant 
improvement. Robust and transparent statistics regar-
ding the financial risk exposure of commercial banks 
as well a state finances are still unavailable. This may 
again reinforce the currently worsening situation on the 
international financial markets. 
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